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STATEMENT OF QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Does the holographic document which is entirely in dece-
dent's handwriting and contains the decedent's handwritten name 
in the body of the document satisfy the holographic will require-
ments of Utah Code Ann, §75-2-503, including the requirement that 
the holographic will contain the Decedent's "signature?" 
2. Was the issue of whether or not the holographic document 
contained the decedent's signature properly before the Court of 
Appeals? 
REFERENCE TO OFFICIAL AND UNOFFICIAL REPORTS 
The Decision of the Utah Court of Appeals in this matter is 
reported in Estate of Erickson v. Misaka, 766 P.2d 1085 (Utah App. 
1988) and 98 Utah Adv. Rep- 64 (Ct. App. Dec. 23, 1988). 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
1. The Decision of the Utah Court of Appeals of which review 
is sought was entered on December 23, 1988. 
2. The Court of Appeals' Order Denying Rehearing was entered 
on January 26, 1989. An Order granting an extension of time 
within which to petition for writ of certiorari until March 2\ 
1989 was entered by this Court on February 23, 1989. 
3. The statutory provision conferring the Utah Supreme Court 
with jurisdiction to review the Decision in question by a Writ of 
Certiorari is Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(3)(a) (Supp. 1988). 
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CONTROLLING STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. §75-2-503 (1978). Holographic Will: 
A will which does not comply with section 75-2-
502 is valid as a holographic will, whether or 
not witnessed, if the signature and the materi-
al provisions are in the handwriting of the 
testator. If there are several holographic 
wills in existence with conflicting provisions, 
the holographic will which is established by 
date or other circumstances to be the will that 
was last executed shall control. If it is 
impossible to determine which will was last 
executed, the consistent provisions of the 
several wills shall be considered valid and the 
inconsistent provisions shall be considered 
invalid. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This case is a formal petition for the probate of a handwrit-
ten document consisting of three cards as the holographic will c: 
Robert E. Erickson, the Decedent. The holographic document \<as 
admitted to probate by the Third District Court, Salt Lake Count; 
the Honorable John A. Rokich presiding. On appeal, the Utah Star-
Court of Appeals reversed the trial court, finding that t-
holographic document did not meet the requirements of Utah Czz 
Ann. §75-2-503 to qualify as a holographic will. 
Statement of the Facts 
Robert E. Erickson ("decedent") died on June 16, 1983. A 
dated June 9, 1955 was admitted to probate and First Interst-
Bank, N.A., was appointed as personal representative of : 
estate. (R. 19-22, 26-27). The personal representative of t 
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estate is the respondent in this matter. Tatsumi Misaka, the 
petitioner herein, filed a petition (R. 70-81) seeking the prcbate 
of a holographic document consisting of three 3" x 5" cards, which 
were discovered among the effects of the decedent following the 
probate of the prior will (R. 84). 
The holographic document, a copy of which is located in the 
Appendix, begins as follows: 
Last Will & Test 
I Robert E. Erickson do hereby state that I 
leave and bequeath to the following persons of 
my family and others.-.. 
Approximately two-thirds of the way down the first card, in the 
middle of a sentence, the writing changes from blue to black ink. 
The remainder of the first card and all of the second and third 
cards are written in the black ink. Additionally, the underlined 
date "8/22/73" was subsequently added to the upper right hand 
corner of the first card, as shown by the underlined date being 
in black ink and partially covering the letter "L" at the begin-
ning of the words "Last Will & Test." (3-P). 
Under the holographic document, Mr. Misaka is the beneficiary 
of a one-half interest in a Park City condominium and is noted as 
the owner of a one-fourth interest in the "F. H. Store." (3-? . 
Mr. Misaka and the decedent were co-investors and partners pricr 
to decedent's death (R. 131), and Mr. Misaka had filed a clai-
against the estate for an interest in the Park City condomim^-
and other properties based on the business association between >'r. 
Misaka and decedent (R. 75-81), which claim was denied by tre 
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personal representative. The personal representative objected to 
the probate of the holographic document (R. 82-83). 
At trial, the holographic document was received into evidence 
and Mr. Misaka presented expert testimony that the entire hologra-
phic document, which includes the name of the decedent in the body 
of the document, was in the decedent's handwriting. (R. 143). 
The personal representative presented evidence regarding the 
physical form of the handwritten name of decedent, testamentary 
intent, and testamentary capacity. Following the trial, the Court 
rejected the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and the Order 
submitted by the Personal Representative (R. 112-119), accepted 
the Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law (R. 122-125) sub-
mitted by Mr. Misaka, and entered an Order admitting the hologra-
phic document to probate as the will of the decedent. (R. 121-
122). 
On appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals, the personal represen 
tative raised two points: Point I, "There was no testamentar 
intent to have the cards made as the holographic will of th 
decedent," and Point II, "The nature of the cards themselves fa. 
to establish a testamentary disposition of the property of t 
decedent." The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court 
decision on a third issue, finding that Mr. Misaka had failed 
prove that the decedent intended that his handwritten name in t 
body of the holographic document be his "signature," and therefc 
that Mr. Misaka had failed to meet his burden of establish 
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prima facia proof that the holographic document contained the 
decedent's signature as required by Utah Code Ann, §75-2-503. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THIS COURT SHOULD EXERCISE ITS POWERS OF SUPERVISION 
BECAUSE THE COURT OF APPEALS1 DECISION 
IMPROPERLY DECIDES THE CASE 
A. MR. MISAKA MET HIS BURDEN OF PROOF THAT THE HOLOGRAPHIC 
DOCUMENT CONTAINS THE DECEDENT'S SIGNATURE, 
1. The Language In The Holographic Document Establishes The 
Decedent's Intent That His Handwritten Name Be His 
Signature. 
Title 75 of the Utah Code Ann. is the Utah Uniform Probate 
Code, which adopted the Uniform Probate Code for the State of 
Utah. See 1975 Laws of Utah, Ch. 150. The execution requirements 
for wills under the Utah Uniform Probate Code ("UUPC") are set 
forth in Utah Code Ann. §§75-2-502 and -503 (1978). These 
sections provide in relevant part as follows: "Except as provided 
for holographic wills, ... every will shall be in writing signed 
by the testator . . . and shall be signed by at least two persons 
each of whom witnessed either the signing or the testator's 
acknowledgement of the signature or of the will." Utah Code Ann. 
§75-2-502 (1978). Utah Code Ann. §75-2-503 (1978) provides _\ 
exception to those execution requirements for holographic wills: 
"A will which does not comply with Section 75-2-502 is valid as 
a holographic will, whether or not witnessed, if the signature ana 
the material provisions are in the handwriting of the testator. 
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Neither §75-2-502 nor -503 requires that the testator's 
signature appear at the end of the will; in fact, the official 
comments to the Uniform Probate Code specifically refute such a 
requirement: 
There is no requirement that the testatorf s 
signature be at the end of the will; thus, if 
he writes his name in the body of the will and 
intends it to be his signature, this would 
satisfy the statute. The intent is to validate 
wills that meet the minimum formalities of the 
statute. 
Editorial Board Comment to Section 2-502 of the Uniform Probate 
Code. 
The requirement of a signature under Utah Code Ann. §75-2-503 
could be used to accomplish a variety of purposes, not all of 
which are consistent with the existing legislative intent to allow 
a will to be signed in the body of the document. The signature 
requirement could act to identify the testator and to prevent 
fraud due to the difficulty of forging a signature. The signature 
requirement could further act to show the testator's understanding 
of the importance and legal significance which accompanies a will 
and that the testator intends the document, whether or no 
presently completed, to be his will. Finally, the signatur 
requirement could act to show the finality of the instrument c 
to protect against deletions of portions of the will. 
In its Opinion in this case, the Court of Appeals interpret 
the signature requirement of the Utah statute as including t 
purpose of showing the finality of the will: 
"The purpose of our statutory scheme is to 
require a course of conduct which assures that 
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a person's will is reduced to handwriting, and 
when handwritten, that the intention is to have 
the writing take legal effect be indicated by 
a signature which records the fact. The signa-
ture requirement shows that the writer finally 
approved the writing and meant for it to be 
operative as a testamentary instrument." 
Estate of Erickson v. Misaka, 766 P.2d 1085, 1088 (Utah App. 
1988). 
The Court of Appeal's interpretation would be consistent with 
a statute requiring that a will be signed at the end, but is 
inconsistent with the UUPC and the Editorial Board Comment to 
Section 2-502 of the Uniform Probate Code which allow a signature 
in the body of the will. In allowing wills to be signed in the 
body, the UUPC implicitly rejects the possible purpose that the 
signature act to show the finality of a will. A will which is 
signed in the body is necessarily signed before the written 
language of the will is complete. Thus, the "signature" require-
ment of Utah Code Ann. §75-2-503 should not be construed to mean 
that the hcindwritten name must be placed on the will to show a 
final approval of the completed document. Imposing a requirement 
of a specific intent that the handwritten name in the body of the 
will be put there for the purpose of authenticating the completed 
will defeats the legislative intent of allowing a will to be 
signed in the body, and also defeats the broad purpose of the 
Uniform Probate Code to "validate wills whenever possible." 
General Comment to Part 5, Editorial Board Comment of the Uniform 
Probate Code. 
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The Opinion of the Court of Appeals implies further that the 
signature requirement under the UUPC is also intended to protect 
against deletions. "Without more, it is an inadequate guard 
against writing being deleted..." Erickson, 766 P.2d at 1088. 
Again, such a purpose is consistent only with a will statute 
requiring a signature at the end. The intent of the UUPC to allow 
a will to be signed in the body implicitly indicates that the 
purposes for the signature requirement do not include safeguarding 
the will against deletions, because a signature in the body of the 
will does not serve to indicate an absolute ending, as a signature 
at the end would. 
While the Utah statute does not support a requirement that the 
signature act to show finality or to guard against deletions, the 
Editorial Board Comment to Section 2-502 provides that the 
testator's handwritten name in the body of the will should be 
intended to be a "signature," indicating that more is require< 
than just a name in the body of the will. This Court should fin 
that the purpose of the signature requirement under the UUPC i 
to show the testator's understanding of the legal significance c 
the act he is undertaking, that is, the act of making a will 
The signature requirement should be construed to validate wil. 
containing the testator's handwritten name in the body of the wi 
in a context which demonstrates the testatorf s operative inte 
for the language to follow, showing the testator's understandi 
of the importance and legal significance of the document bea 
prepared, and thus authenticating the will. 
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The Court of Appeals has improperly given no weight to the 
language immediately surrounding the Testator's handwritten name 
in the exordium clause. The language "I Robert E. Erickson do 
hereby state that I leave and bequeath..." immediately underneath 
the title "Last Will & Test," shows clear operative intent that 
the document he was preparing serve as his will. The Testator 
could hardly have expressed his intent more clearly. The language 
"do hereby state" shows the intent of the Testator to validate the 
will with the handwritten name which immediately precedes those 
words. 
The courts in other states have recognized a handwritten name 
in an exordium clause to be evidence of an intent to validate or 
authenticate the will by placing the name in that context. In 
Smith v. McDonald, 252 Ark. 931, 481 S.W.2d 741 (1972) the court 
validated the will which began "I, Julian Leland Rutherford...do 
hereby make, publish and declare this to be my last will and 
testament..«" The same court, in Nelson v. Texarkana Historical 
Socfy and Museum, 257 Ark. 931, 481 S.W.2d 882 (1972) found the 
signature requirement not met where the testator's handwritten 
name only appeared in the context of stating that certain property 
was given in memory of the testator. The California Supreme Court 
has adopted a standard even broader than the proposed standard, 
finding that intent to sign can be shown by the handwritten name 
of the testator in the phrase "Bonds belonging solely to Helene 
I. Bloch." In re Blocks Estate, 39 Cal.2d 570, 248 P.2d 21 
(1952). Two of the cases cited by the Court of Appeals in 
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Footnote 3 of its Opinion to support the courtf s statement that 
in proper circumstances a handwritten name in the body of the will 
could be written with the intent to be a signature actually 
support the probate of the present holographic document. Those 
cases found handwritten names in the body of the wills to be 
signatures based solely on language in the will, similar to the 
language in the present holographic document, supporting the 
testator's operative intent for the document• See In re Estate 
of Glass, 165 Cal. App.2d 380, 331 P.2d 1045 (1958) (signature 
requirement met where will provided "This is Louis R. Glass I 
wish to Retract my last Will witch I left my sister Ester Glass 
now Mrss Zipkin & give my belongings to my Three Nefeu & 
Nice....") and Burton v. Bell, 380 S.W.2d 561 (Tex. 1964) (signa-
ture requirement met by exordium clause which provided "That I, 
Roy Wheeler Bell, of Harris Co. Tex being of sound disposing mine 
memory, do hereby make this my last will & testament, hereby 
revoking any & all other wills heretofore made by me"). In In r 
Estate of Fegley, 42 Colo. App. 47, 589 P.2d 80 (1978), the cour 
addressed the question of whether the testator's signature i 
required at the end of a will under Colorado's version of tl 
Uniform Probate Code, which contains a holographic will provisic 
identical to the relevant portion of Utah Code Ann. §75-2-50 
The court held that "the intent of the testator -- not t 
location of his name -- is the crucial factor in determini 
whether a holographic will has been signed within the meaning 
[the Colorado holographic will statute]." Id. at 81. The coi 
10 
determined that the testator lacked the necessary testamentary 
intent that a will have immediate effect because the holographic 
document contained the phrase "witness my hand...," followed by 
a blank signature space and an attestation clause, which the court 
saw as indicating that the testator intended to sign the will at 
a later date, and that the testator did not intend her name in the 
body of the will to be her signature. The conclusion of the court 
in Fegley is consistent with the proposed standard because the 
format of the will, containing a blank signature space followed 
by an attestation clause, indicated that the testator intended to 
take further action to validate the will. 
Finding that a will contains a signature in situations which 
demonstrate the testator's operative intent for the language to 
follow is not contrary to the general statutory definition of 
"signature" contained in Utah Code Ann. §68-3~12(2)(r) (Supp. 
1988) that a signature is "any name, mark or sign written with the 
intent to authenticate any instrument or writing" because the 
language preceding that definition provides that H[T]he following 
definitions shall be observed, unless the definition would be 
inconsistent with the manifest intent of the legislature, or 
repugnant to the context of the statute." Id. at §68-3-12(2). 
By allowing signatures in the body of a will, the legislature has 
implicitly approved "authenticating" the writing following a 
signature in the body of a will. 
2. The Decedent's Subsequent Dating Of The Holographic 
Document Adopted The Handwritten Name As A Signature. 
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In addition to the language in the exordium, the decedent 
dated the holographic document after it was written, thereby 
acknowledging and adopting the handwritten name in the exordium 
clause as his signature. The subsequent dating of the will 
indicates that Mr. Erickson had completed the will and done 
everything he intended to do. Case law supports the concept of 
a person "adopting" a prior handwritten name as a signature. In 
In re Kinney's Estate, 16 Cal.2d 50, 104 P.2d 782 (1940), the 
court found the signature adopted based on the will being "com-
plete." The court said that a will was not complete if it 
appeared from the instrument that the decedent had not "done 
everything they intended to do." See also Estate of McCarty, 2" 
Cal. Rptr. 94, 211 Cal. App.2d 23 (1962) (signature adopted b< 
underlining at later date). 
3. Decedent fs Intent That The Handwritten Name Be Hi 
Signature Can Be Inferred From The Existence of Testamen 
tary Intent. 
The Court of Appeals1 Opinion reads into the statute 
specific intent requirement that the testator's handwritten nar 
be "written with the intent that it operate as an authenticati< 
of the document as a will" to accompany the general mte 
requirement that testamentary intent be present. Erickson, 7 
P.2d at 1088. Reaching the conclusion that a person intended 
entire document, including the handwritten name, to be a will, t 
that the will is invalid because no specific intent to sign < 
will is shown, is a conclusion that defies the purpose of the U1 
to validate wills whenever possible. If the handwritten name m 
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be placed in the will with the specific intent of authenticating 
the completed document as a will, then the existence of testamen-
tary intent should allow an inference to be drawn that a name 
written in the body of the will was done with the intent that it 
be a signature and authenticate the document. The trial court 
found the existence of testamentary intent regarding the hologra-
phic document at issue, based on extrinsic evidence as well as the 
document itself. That testamentary intent infers the existence 
of the decedent's intent that his handwritten name was placed m 
exordium clause to authenticate the will, especially in light of 
the surrounding language in the exordium clause. 
4. The Form Of The Holographic Document Does Not Negate The 
Decedent's Signatory Intent. 
The Court of Appeals' Opinion addresses several aspects cf 
the holographic document which should bear no weight as to either 
the issue of whether the will contains a signature or the issue 
of testamentary intent. The fact that the will is written on tne 
unlined side of index cards does not in any way imply a lack :: 
either intent to sign or tesramentary intent. The relevart 
inquiry is what was written, not the material which contains tre 
writing. The Utah Court of Appeals has recognized that inunater:-. 
language on pre-printed forms can be ignored in validati 
holographic wills. Estate of Fitzgerald, 738 P.2d 236 (Utah C:. 
App. 1987). In the same manner, the use of the lined or "-e 
unlined side of the cards is irrelevant. 
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The fact that the index cards are not attached to each other 
has no bearing on signatory intent or testamentary intent. This 
Court addressed that issue in In re Lovefs Estate, 75 Utah 342, 
285 P.299 (1930), stating that several loose or detached sheets 
may serve as a will if, as is the present case, the sheets can be 
coherently read together as a will and contain nothing out of 
harmony with the general conception of a will. The present 
holographic document meets that standard. 
The Court of Appeals stated in its Opinion that the nature of 
the holographic document suggests that it was unfinished or 
constituted a draft. By allowing laymen to prepare holographic 
wills, the Utah statute sets a priority on carrying out the 
testator's intent rather than on the form of the instrument. 
Admittedly, the holographic document at issue is crude, but that 
crudeness does not bear on the requisites for a valid holographic 
will. The fact that the first card was subsequently datec 
indicates that the will was completed. Nothing in the holographic 
document indicates that the decedent intended to take any furthe 
action to complete the will. The mere fact that the deceden 
could have disposed of additional property if he chose to do s 
does not support a conclusion that the will is incomplete 
especially where decedent's prior will is not revoked by tt 
holographic document at issue. Even if the holographic documei 
was not completed, however, the broad purpose of the UUPC 
validate wills whenever possible should support validating a wi 
which otherwise meets the statutory requirements. In the prese 
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case, the clear language of the exordium clause and the subsequent 
dating are far better evidence of the testator's intent to sign 
the will than the rough nature of the documents. 
In regard to the possibility that the cards were a "draft," 
an intent to later prepare a more formal document does not 
preclude or detract from the testator's intent in regard to an 
earlier document. In re Kutter's Estate, 160 Cal. App.2d 322, 
325, P-2d 624, 631 (1958); Richberg v. Robbins, 33 Tenn. App. 66, 
228 S.W.2d 1019, 1022 (1950); In re Estate of Teubert, 298 S.E.2d 
456, 461 (W.Va. 1982). 
B. THE COURT OF APPEALS IMPROPERLY REVERSED THE TRIAL COURT BASED 
ON AN ISSUE NOT RAISED ON APPEAL. 
The personal representative did not raise the issue at trial 
or on appeal of whether the decedent intended his handwritten name 
to be his "signature." As stated by the Court of Appeals in its 
Opinion in this case, "the parties and the court below seem to 
have focused on the broader issue of whether decedent intended 
these cards to be his will...," Erickson, 766 P.2d at 1087, and 
ff[T]he findings and conclusions entered by the trial court, as 
well as the appellate briefs for both parties, fail to distinguish 
intent for these two different purposes." Ld. at 1087 fn. 2. 
At the trial, the Personal Representative of the Estate, the 
Appellant herein, raised only the issue that testamentary intent 
did not exist regarding the will. (R-128-175). See specifically 
the Personal Representative's argument for dismissal following Mr. 
Misaka's evidence (R 147-150) and closing argument (R 171-173). 
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In arguing that testamentary intent was lacking, the Personal 
Representative did cite In re Bloch's Estate, 39 Cal.2d 570, 248 
P.2d 21 (1952) regarding affixing the signature with intent to 
authenticate (R-148), but did so only as part of his argument that 
testamentary intent was lacking. Bloch's Estate's broad holding 
finding an intent to sign where the handwritten name was used in 
describing property of the decedent actually supports a finding 
of an intent to sign in the present case. Further, while the 
issue of intent to sign was also addressed in the Personal 
Representative's discussion of points (R 106-111), that document 
was filed some 17 days after trial and 12 days after the Court's 
Order (R 104), and contained no legal authority on the issue 
except a citation to 19 A.L.R.2d 926. The Personal Represen-
tative's brief filed with the Court of Appeals addressed directly 
only the issue of testamentary intent, while in that discussion 
addressing intent to authenticate as part of that overall tes-
tamentary intent. 
While it is proper for a court on appeal to affirm based oi 
grounds not raised at the trial level, see Branch v. Wester 
Petroleum, Inc., 657 P.2d 267, 276 (Utah 1982), this Court ha 
repeatedly held that an issue will not be considered for the firs 
time on appeal in cases where the new issue is raised to revers 
the trial court's decision. See, e.g., Traynor v. Cushing, 6f 
P.2d 856, 857 (Utah 1984). As the Court of Appeals stated 
James v. Preston, 746 P.2d 799 (Utah App. 1987): 
"Theories or issues which are not apparent or 
reasonably discernable from the pleadings, 
16 
affidavits, and exhibits will not be consider-
ed." Minnehoma Fin. Co, v. Pauli, 565 P.2d 
835, 838 (Wyo. 1977). In particular, even if 
pleadings are generously interpreted, if they 
are not supported by any factual showing or by 
the submission of legal authority, they are not 
presented for decision. 
In the present case, the Personal Representative's failure to 
clearly raise the issue of whether the decedent intended his 
handwritten name to be his signature falls within the perimeters 
of James v. Preston, and should not have been considered by the 
Court of Appeals on appeal. 
POINT II 
THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS RENDERED AN IMPORTANT DECISION 
OF STATE LAW WHICH HAS NOT BEEN, BUT SHOULD BE, 
DECIDED BY THIS COURT. 
As recognized by the Court of Appeals, the issue presented in 
this case of the requirements of a signature in the body of a 
holographic will is one of first impression in Utah. Erickson, 
766 P.2d at 1086 fn.l. While the issue has been addressed in many 
other jurisdictions, see Annot., 19 A.L.R.2d 926 (1951), the Court 
in In re Fegley, 42 Colo- App. 47, 589 P. 2d 80 (1978) is the only 
court to have addressed the issue in a jurisdiction which has 
adopted the Uniform Probate Code. The issue in the present case 
is important in the context of the UUPC and its stated intent to 
"validate wills whenever possible," Editorial Board Comment to the 
Uniform Probate Code, General Comment to Part 5, and to "validate 
wills that meet the minimum formalities of the statute." Id. , 
Comment to Section 2-502. The likelihood of laymen succeeding in 
17 
carrying out their intended testamentary disposition will be 
significantly reduced if the Court of Appeals' Decision is allowed 
to stand. It is unlikely that any holographic will would contain 
any language in the will itself indicating an intent to sign 
significantly clearer than the language in the present holographic 
document. Therefore, this case is important in determining 
whether the legislative intent to allow wills to be signed in the 
body of the document will be given real meaning, or whether it 
will be allowed in name only, subject to a standard of proof 
regarding intent to sign which is effectively unmeetable. As the 
California Supreme Court stated in Estate of Black, 641 P.2d 754 
(1982), the California Supreme Court stated: 
If testators are to be encouraged by a statute 
like ours to draw their own wills, the courts 
should not adopt, upon purely technical reason-
ing, a construction which would result in 
invalidating such wills in half the cases. 
WHEREFORE, Petitioner, Tatsumi Misaka, prays that the Court 
grant this Petition for Writ of Certiorari. 
Respectfully submitted this «*- / day of March, 1989. 
WATKISS & CAMPBELL 
\JL^^ -1- ^ryi & 
KEN P. J^NES 
Attorneys, If or Respondent, 
Tatsumi Misaka 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that four (4) copies of the foregoing 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari were caused to be hand-delivered 
upon Randy S. Ludlow, Attorney for Respondent, 311 South State 
Street, Suite 280, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this 127-*--' day of 
March, 1989. 
WATKISS & CAMPBELL 
/CLx, r-SV.^^-
KEN P. JONES \ 
Attorneys for Respondent, 
TatsumiNMisaka 
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APPENDIX 
1. Copy of Court of Appeals' Decision, Estate of Erickson v. 
Misaka, 766 P.2d 1085 (Utah App. 1988). 
2. Copy of Utah State Court of Appeals' Order Denying Rehearing 
dated January 26, 1989. 
3. Copy of the Holographic Will of Robert E. Erickson. 
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APPENDIX 1 
ESTATE OP ERICKSON •. MISAKA Utah 1085 
ChmmlU fJd lOtd (UtakApp. IMS) 
In the Matter of the ESTATE OF Robert 
E. ERICKSON, Deceased, Appellant, 
TaUumi MISAKA, Respondent 
No. 880139-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Dec. 23, 1988. 
A petition for probate of three hand-
written three-inch by five-inch cards as de-
cedent's holographic will was filed. The 
Third District Court, Salt Lake County, 
John A. Rokich, J., admitted the cards to 
probate, and personal representative ap-
pealed. The Court of Appeals, Jackson, J., 
held that there was no evidence that dece-
dent's name was written in the introducto-
ry clause on one card with the intent that it 
constitute authentication of one or all of 
the cards as a will 
Final judgment and order vacated 
1. Wills *=>133 
Decedent's intent is crucial factor in 
determining whether purported holograph-
ic will has been signed within meaning of 
statute pertaining to execution of wills. 
U.C.A.1953, 75-2-503. 
2. Wills «=>130, 131 
Although statutory requirements for 
execution of valid holographic wills are 
minimal, statute is mandatory and not di-
rectory, holographic document is invalid as 
will-despite deceased's clear intent that doc-
ument will be will-unless document com-
plies with governing statute UC.A.1953, 
7S-2-503. 
3. Wills e»133 
Decedent's handwritten name in body 
of purported holographic will is not, by 
itself, prima facie evidence that document 
contains decedent's signature; handwritten 
name must have been written with intent 
that it operate as authentication of doc-
ument as will in order for it to be signa-
ture. U.C.A.1953, 68-3-12(2Xr), 75-2-503. 
f U S Irtah 766 PACIFIC REPORTER; 2d SERIES 
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'' fhfee handwritten three-inch by five-
inch cards were inadmissible as holograph 
will despite fact that decedent's name was 
written in introductory clause on one card; 
thera was no evidence that decedent's 
name was written with intent that it consti-
tute authentication of one or ail of cards as 
will. U.C.A.1953, 75-2-503. 
5. Wills *»133 
It is possible for handwritten name at 
beginning of body of will to be written with 
intent that it be requisite signature, but 
there must be support in evidence for that 
intent 
Randy S. Ludlow (argued), Salt Lake 
City, for appellant 
Herscheil J. Saperstein, Ken P. Jones 
(argued), Watkiss and Campbell, Salt Lake 
City, for respondent 
Before GARFF, BILLINGS and 
JACKSON, JJ. 
JACKSON, Judge: 
Robert E. Eriekson died in June 1983. 
Hit form** wiB, executed June 9,1956, was 
admitted to probate in July 1988 and the 
designated personal representative appoint-
ed. Iii October 1986, respondent Tatsumi 
Misaka filed a petition for probate of three 
handwritten 3" x 5' cards as Erickson's 
holographic wflL In this appeal, the per-
sonal representative challenges the trial 
court's admission of the cards to probate. 
Because we conclude there is insufficient 
evidence that Eriekson intended his hand-
written name on one of the cards to be his 
•ngjMtart for purposes of Utah Code Ann. 
( 75-2-608 (1978), we vacate the final or-
der and judgment below. 
[1] The right to dispose of property by 
will is governed and controlled by statute. 
1. The issue presented in this appeal in one of 
first impression in this state. Utah is one of 
sixteen states to adopt ail or part of the Uniform 
Probate Code since 1972. See Utah Code Ann. 
S§ 75-1-101 to 7S-S-101 (1978) (effective July 
1, 19711. The others are: Alaska (1973); Arizo-
na (1974); Colorado (1974); Florida (1975); Ha-
waii (1976k Idaho (1972); Kentucky (1976) 
In re WoleotVs Estate, 54 Utah 165,180 P. 
169 (1919). The introductory Editorial 
Board Comment to Part 5 of the Utah 
Uniform Probate Code,1 Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 7^-2-501 through -513 (1978), notes 
that its provisions are intended to validate 
a will whenever possible. This goal is 
achieved, in part, by keeping the formali-
ties for a written and attested will to a 
minimum, see section 75-2-502, and by au-
thorizing holographic wills written and 
signed by the testator 
A will which does not comply with 
section 75-2-502 [requiring, among other 
things, the signatures of two witnesses] 
is valid as a holographic will, whether or 
not witnessed, if the signature and the 
material provisions are in the handwrit-
ing of the testator 
Utah Code Ann. § 7&-2-50S (1978) (empha-
sis added). As the Editorial Board Com-
ment to section 75-2-502 makes clear, the 
requisite signature need not be at the end 
of a will. If the testator "writes his name 
in the body of the will and intends it to be 
his signature, this would satisfy the stat-
ute." (Emphasis added.) Thus, the dece-
dent's intent is the crucial factor in deter-
mining whether a purported holographic 
will has been signed within the meaning of 
section 75-2-508. See In re Estate of Feg-
ley, 42 ColoJtpp. 47, 589 P.2d 80, 81 (1978) 
(construing identical statute). 
[2] Although the statutory require-
ments for execution of a valid holographic 
will are minimal, the statute is mandatory 
and not directory. A holographic doc-
ument is invalid as a will—despite the de-
ceased's clear intent that the document be 
a will—unless the document complies with 
the governing statute. In Re Wolcott's 
Estate, 180 P. at 170 (decided under prior 
statute requiring holographic will to be en-
tirely written, dated, and signed by testa-
(ooly Art VII, Part 1); Maine (1961); Michigan 
(1979); Minnesota (1975); Montana (1975); Ne-
braska (1977); New Mexico (1976); North Da-
kota (1975); and South Carolina (19S7). Due to 
the recency of adoption by only a small minori-
ty of states, there is a dearth of case law con-
struing the provisions of the Uniform Probate 
Code. 
ESTATE OF ERICKSON T. MISAKA 
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tor). Sm 2 Page on the Law of Wills 
i 20.4 (W.&m* k D. Parker ed 1960). 
Under Ufch Code Ann. § 75-3-407 
(1978), proponents of wills in contested 
cases always have the burden of establish-
ing prima facie proof of their due execu-
tion, while contestants bear the burden of 
establishing lack of testamentary intent 
See In re Estate of Olschansky, 735 P.2d 
927, 929 (1987). 
The proof in support of probate must be 
sufficient to convince the court that the 
paper produced is the lawful will of the 
testator. 
A prima facie case is made when it is 
shown that all the requirements of law 
have been observed in fee execution of 
the will, and unless such prima facie case 
is made the court should refuse probate 
even where probate is not contested. G. 
Thompson, The Law of Wills, 3rd Ed., 
§ 199. 
In re Estate of Craddocky 179 Mont 74, 
586 P.2d 292, 294 (1978) (proponent failed 
to establish prima facie case that purported 
holographic will was written entirely by 
testator, as required by statute). 
Applying these principles to the instant 
case, it was respondent Misaka's burden to 
make a prima facie showing that the pur-
ported holographic will contained the "sig-
nature" required by section 75-2-508. On 
this issue, respondent introduced only the 
three unnumbered and unattached cards, 
which were apparently discovered in a desk 
drawer along with other belongings of de-
cedent They read as follows, with unread-
able portions indicated: 
8/22/73 Last Will + Tett I 
Robert £. Enekaoo do 
hereby state that I leave 
and hnqneati to the fol-
lowing persons of my fam-
ily + othen ea My demiae 
I want to leere to my wife 
Dorothy Erieksoo tie 
the F H Store shall go {U 
to Dorothy Vi to REE 
Jr "A to Sheryl [unreada-
ble] the other V« ui owned 
by T Miaaka The condo-
minium at Park City m to 
go To 74 REE Jr l/< to 
Sheryl + l* T T [Madaka 
2. The finding! and conclusions entered by the 
trial court, as well as the appellate briefs of both 
parties, fail to distinguish "intent" for these two 
different purposes. The distinction is pointed 
out in Note, Wills—Validity of Signature for 
Holographic Wills, 28 Ark.L.Rev 521 (1975), dis-
cussing Nelson v. Texarkana Historical Soc'y and 
Museum, 257 Ark. 394, 516 S.W.2d 882 (1974), 
and Smt v. MacDonald, 252 Ark. 931, 481 
home at 1378 Blaine Ave 
until she remarries, after 
which the home shall be 
sold +. l/i go to her ¥ l/«to 
REE Jr + V« to Sheryl 
Ann Enckaon 
Utah 1087 
or Maaaka] My Interest in 
Nevada Scratch to Go to 
Dorothy in Total 
My Insurance to cover my 
interest in the Holladay 
store to go to Dorothy in 
Total—160,000 or more, 
other stock interests-
Some Zions Utah Bank 
[Craft or Croft] to go To 
Sheryl +• Bobby Share + 
Share alike 
On the basis of these writings, respon-
dent Misaka is claiming a one-half interest 
in Erickson's Park City condominium. 
Without admission ot the index cards to 
probate as a valid holographic will, Misaka 
takes nothing; the distribution of the prop-
erty is controlled by the terms of Eriek-
son's formal 1955 will 
Although the parties and the court below 
seem to have focused on the broader issue 
of whether decedent intended these cards 
to be a will, the relevant inquiry is whether 
the evidence is sufficient to show decedent 
Erickson intended that his handwritten 
name near the top one of the cards be his 
signature.2 Misaka offered no evidence ex-
trinsic to the cards themselves as proof of 
Erickson's intent The trial court conclud-
ed the three index cards contained the "sig-
nature" required by section 75-2-503 for a 
valid holographic will, without specifying 
the particulars in the three cards relied on 
to implicitly find that Erickson intended his 
handwritten name to be his signature. 
This determination of the decedent's intent, 
based solely on the trial court's examina-
tion of the purported will, is a matter of 
law, see In re Love's Estate, 75 Utah 342, 
285 P 299 (1930), which we review on ap-
peal under a correction-of-error standard. 
Western Kane County Special Serv. Dist 
No. 1 v. Jackson Cattle Co., 744 P.2d 1376, 
1378 (Utah 1987). 
[3] In the definitions provided by the 
legislature to guide construction of Utah 
S.W^d 741 (1972). In Nelson, as m this case, 
the evidence extrinsic to the purported will itself 
went only to the question of general testamenta-
ry intent, i.e., did the decedent intend the writ-
ing to be a will, not to whether she intended her 
name in the body of the instrument to be her 
signature. Nelson, 257 Ark. at 398, 516 S.W.2d 
at 884. 
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atjrt^l^hrignature" is defined as includ-
ing "w&lmam, mark, or sign written with 
the intent to authenticate any instrument 
or writing." Utah Code Ann. 
I 68-3-12(2Xr) (1988). A decedent's hand-
written name in the body of the purported 
holographic will is not, by itself, prima 
faae evidence that the document contains 
the decedent's signature. In the context of 
section 75-2-503, such a handwntten name 
must have been written with the intent that 
it operate as an authentication of the doc-
ument as a will m order for it to be a 
signature. The purpose of our statutory 
scheme is to require a course of conduct 
which assures that a person's will is re-
duced to writing and, when handwntten, 
that the intention to have the wnting take 
legal effect be indicated by a signature 
which irecords that fact The signature 
requirement shows that the wnter finally 
approved the wnting and meant for it to be 
operative as a testamentary instrument 
See Mcchem, The Rule m Lemayne v 
Stanley, 29 Mieh.L.Rev. 685, 690-96 (1931) 
[41 (>ur review of the purported holo-
graphic will in this case leads us to con-
clude that it does not contain the signature 
required by the statute before it can be 
admitted to probate. The three cards in 
evidence are index cards on which only the 
unhned sides have been written. They 
were not attached to each other. There is 
no concluding language on any of the 
cards, and they otherwise give no indica-
tion that they are, taken together, a com-
pleted document Indeed, the nature of the 
note cards, the use of abbreviations, lack of 
punctuation, and the perfunctory, open-end-
ed wording strongly suggest that the 
cards,'as a document, are unfinished or 
constitute a draft 
Although the handwntten name of the 
decedent appears in the phrase "I Robert 
3. £ * , Smith v. MacDonaU 252 Ark. 931. 4*1 
S.WJd 741 (1972) (handwntten name in tide 
and exordium clause constitutes signature re-
quired by statute); In re Estate of Glass. 165 
CaLAptUd 3^0, 331 ?2d 1045 (1958) (handwnt-
ten name in h^Hirg of document. This is 
Louis R. Glass"); Burton v Bell, 380 S W 2d 561 
(Tex, 1964) (handwntten name in exordium 
clause, That I, Roy Wheeler Bell. ," is signa-
ture rec|uired for holographic will) Bui see In 
re Bernard's Estate, 197 Cal 36. 239 P 404 
E. Enckson do hereby state/' the wnting 
contains nothing indicating the name was 
intended as the required executing signa-
ture. There is nothing on the face of the 
cards to affirmatively or by necessary im-
plication suggest that decedent wrote his 
name for any other purpose than to iden-
tify himself as the wnter See In re Ber-
nard's Estate, 197 Cal. 36, 239 P 404 
(1925); see generally, Annotation, Place of 
Signature of Holographic Wills, 19 A.li 
R.2d 926, 939-44 (1951). In short, there is 
no evidence that decedent's name was writ-
ten m the introductory clause on one card 
with the intent that it constitute authenti-
cation of one or all of the cards as a will. 
Respondent, therefore, failed to make a 
prima faae showing that the purported 
holographic will contained the authenticat-
ing signature required by section 75-2-503. 
[5] It is, of course, possible for a hand-
written name at the beginning of the body 
of a will to be wntten with the intent that 
it be the requisite signature.1 However, 
there must be support in the evidence for 
that intent Standing alone, it is equivocal, 
leaving the decedent's final approval and 
authentication of the writing in doubt 
Without more, it is an inadequate guard 
against wnting being deleted, a possibility 
in this case if additional cards were wntten 
upon by Enckson only to be lost, mis-
placed, or discarded by him or others. 
The final judgment and order of the trial 
court admitting the cards to probate as 
decedent's holographic will is vacated. 
Costs to appellant 
GARFF and BILLINGS, JJ, concur 
(1925) (no intent that name in exordium be 
signature where document terminated abruptly 
after a specific bequest), Estate of Fegley, 42 
ColoApp. 47. 5S9 P 2d 80 (1978) (phrase at end 
of instrument "witness my hand * followed 
by blank signature space indicates decedent in-
tended to sign later and did not intend hand-
wntten name in exordium clause to be her 
signature), Davis v Davis, 86 Okla. 255, 207 P 
1065 (1922) (same phrase and result as fegley) 
APPENDIX 2 
UTAH STATE COURT OF APPEALS 
In the Matter of the Estate 
of Robert E. Erickson, 
Deceased, 
Appellant, 
v. 
Tatsumi Misaka, 
Respondent. 
ORDER 
No, 880139-CA 
This matter is before the Court upon a Petition for Rehearing 
filed by the respondent, Tatsumi Misaka• 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the respondent's petition for 
rehearing is denied. 
Dated th is tlptttoi ay of January, 1989. 
FOR THE COURT: 
Mary T/ Noonan gfrft. 
of the Court 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on 27, January 1989 I mailed a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing ORDER by depositing the same with the 
United States Mail, postage prepaid to the following: 
Randy S. Ludlow 
Attorney for Appellant 
311 South State, Suite 280 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Herschell J. Saperstein 
Ken P. Jones 
Watkiss and Campbell 
Attorneys for Respondent 
310 South Main Street, Suite 1200 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
DATED this 27th day of January, 1989, 
By 
Kathleen Flynn N \J 
Case Management Clerk 
p-teste 
F
'LED l,M CLERK'S OFFICf 
Salt Lake County Utah 
Cf 151385 
DixonNjiiri'-»«>,
 w J l 
A 
> > 
^ 
^ 
n4Wwi 
^ 
^ 
DeriOrv r > 
/*'3c 
